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During the Pacific War, problems concerning the future of Korea were actively 
discussed in the conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925–1960), 
which was noted as an international non-governmental organization specializing in 
problems in the Asia-Pacific region. In its international conferences (Mont Tremblant, 
Quebec, Canada, 1942; Hot Springs, Virginia, U.S., 1945), decolonization was the most 
controversial issue because it was deeply concerned with defining not only the war 
ideology, but also the nature of the postwar world order. The Korean problem was 
treated in relation to the future of the occupied areas of Japan, and all options were on 
the table.  
 This article describes what kind of an organization the IPR was, and then goes into 
the details of the diverse views on the future of Korea in its international conferences. 
The crux of the matter was choosing either to implement a “mandate” over Korea or to 
allow Korea “immediate independence” after the war. Chinese, British and American 
delegates attending the conferences generally expressed the view that international 
administration or some form of international assistance would be needed during the 
period prior to full admission of Korea to the international community. However, 
Andrew J. Grajdanzev, research associate of the International Secretariat of the IPR, 
argued for the immediate independence of Korea. He also maintained that liberated 
Korea should build “a cooperative commonwealth” based on the nationalization of its 
main industries and land reform. His argument seems to have reflected a progressive 
tendency within the International Secretariat after the Great Depression. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After the Japanese annexation in 1910, Korea became a forgotten nation in the 
international community. When the nationalist movement brought about open 
resistance to colonial rule in 1919, Western powers regarded it as an internal affair 
of Japan and did not show any official response to the Koreans’ appeal. However, 
following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, the Allied Powers, 
including the United States, began to re-examine their Korean policy.  
During the Pacific War, the international discussions on the Korean problem 
were held at two levels. First, at the government level, the discussions concerning 
the future status of Korea took place among the Allied leaders at the various 
conferences of Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. Thus, the heads of the United 
States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, and the Soviet Union reached 
agreement on the establishment of a joint trusteeship over Korea after the war. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had the leading role in drawing up this agreement, felt 
that “the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent 
government and that they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage.” 1 
Roosevelt’s idea on trusteeship over colonial territories, like Woodrow Wilson’s 
mandate concept, was inspired both by the expansive needs of American 
capitalism and by his own liberal-internationalist ideology.2 Extensive research on 
these matters has already been conducted.3 
Second, at a private level, the Korean problem was actively discussed in the 
conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR, 1925–1960), which is 
considered to have been an institutional precursor of today’s international non-
governmental organizations specializing in problems in the Asia-Pacific region.4 
The Institute was at the height of its political influence during the Pacific War and 
1 Department of  State, U.S., United States Policy Regarding Korea, 1834–1950 (Chuncheon: Insititute 
of  Asian Culture Studies, Hallym University, 1987), 86. 
2 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of  the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of  Separate Regimes, 
1945–1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 104–109.  
3 See ibid, Chapter 3; Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950: An Evaluation of  American 
Responsibility (Berkeley and Los Angles: University of  California Press, 1967); James Irving Matray, 
The Reluctant Crusade : American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950 (Honolulu : University of  Hawaii 
Press, 1985); Tae-yŏl Ku, Han’guk kukche kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu [A study on the history of  Korea’s 
international relations], 2 (Sŏul: Yŏksa Pip’yŏngsa, 1995); Yong-uk Chŏng, Haebang chŏnhu Miguk ŭi 
taehan chŏngch’aek [United States policy toward Korea before and after the Liberation], (Sŏul: Sŏul 
Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2003).  
4 As regards the historiography of  the Institute of  Pacific Relations, refer to Yutaka Sasaki, “The 
Struggle for Scholarly Objectivity: Unofficial Diplomacy and the Institute of  Pacific Relations 
from the Sino-Japanese War to the McCarthy Era,” Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers, the State 
University of  New Jersey-New Brunswick, 2005, 22–31.  
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played a vital role as the Allied countries’ wartime “think-tank” or “unofficial 
diplomatic channel.” In its international conferences (Mont Tremblant, Quebec, 
Canada, 1942; Hot Springs, Virginia, U.S., 1945), decolonization was the most 
controversial issue because it was central to defining not only the war ideology, 
but also the nature of the postwar world order.5 The Korean agenda was treated 
in relation to the future of the occupied areas of Japan, and all options, including 
the immediate independence of Korea after the defeat of Japan, were on the table. 
However, there has been still no proper research on this subject.  
This study first describes what kind of an organization the Institute of Pacific 
Relations was, and then goes into the details of the diverse views on the future of 
Korea in its international conferences. It reveals that finding a solution to the 
Korean problem during the Pacific War was a complex and delicate issue. This 
was because the Allied Powers, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, 
China, and the Soviet Union, had quite different interests in Korea due to the 
geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula. (Just half a century before, Japan 
had waged wars against China and Russia to occupy Korea.) Even though the IPR 
was “one of the premier non-governmental organizations operating at the 
international level for much of the early twentieth century,”6 intellectuals from 
countries who were involved in the activities of this organization could not be free 
from the interests of their home country. A closer look at the activities of the IPR 
also discloses an interesting aspect about the relationship between the state and 
intellectuals in the interwar period. The IPR documents in the archives of the 
University of Hawai‘i, Columbia University in New York, and the University of 
British Columbia in Vancouver are the primary sources.7 
 
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS IN WARTIME 
 
The Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in 1925 in Hawai‘i by the initiative 
of American intellectuals, then “only a few far-sighted people,” who realized the 
need for greater knowledge and understanding of the Asia-Pacific region. They 
were in a sense “Asia Firsters” who believed that the material prosperity and 
5 For details, see ibid., Chapter 3–5;  Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: the United States, 
Japan, and the Institute of  Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–45 (London & New York: Routledge, 
2002), Chapter 9; Alan Raucher, “The First Foreign Affairs Think Tanks,” American Quarterly, 30-4 
(Autumn 1978), 493–513; Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of  a Kind: the United States, Britain, and the 
War against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 209–214. 
6 Lawrence T. Woods, “Letters in Support of  the Institute of  Pacific Relations: Defending a 
Nongovernmental Organization,” Pacific Affairs, 76-4 (Winter 2003/2004), 611. 
7 William L. Holland, “Source Materials on the Institute of  Pacific Relations,” Pacific Affairs, 58-1 
(Spring 1985), 91–97.  
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democracy of America would depend on its expansion to foreign countries, 
especially into Asia via the Pacific Ocean. The IPR was designed as an unofficial, 
international, non-partisan association of private national societies in the countries 
located in or having interests in the Pacific area. Its object, as stated in its 
constitution, was “to study the conditions of the Pacific peoples with a view to 
the improvement of their mutual relations.”8 
In the mid-1930s, the IPR consisted of the following national councils: 
  
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations 
Australian Institute of International Affairs 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs 
China Institute of Pacific Relations 
Comité d’Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique (France) 
Japanese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations 
Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council, Institute of Pacific Relations 
New Zealand Branch, Institute of Pacific Relations 
Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (United Kingdom) 
U.S.S.R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations9 
  
Each national council was autonomous with its own distinctive organization 
and program. All of them were devoted to research, discussion, and publication 
on the political, economic, and diplomatic problems of the Far East and the 
Pacific. They stood for “objective fact-finding,” “free discussion” in which many 
view points were represented, and the dissemination of reliable, up-to-date 
information on contemporary problems. The international governing body of the 
IPR was the Pacific Council, consisting of one member appointed by each 
national council. The International Secretariat, under the direction of the Pacific 
Council, maintained liaison among the national councils to coordinate their 
activities. It also published an international quarterly review, Pacific Affairs.10 
The IPR’s activities consisted of two closely related parts: (1) an international 
conference held at two or three year intervals, and (2) a variety of research 
programs on both the national and international level, which were closely 
integrated with the international conference. Overall, it should be stressed that at 
8 American Institute of  Pacific Relations, Understanding Asia: The Aims and Work of  the Institute of  
Pacific Relations (New York: American Council, 1951), 10–11. 
9 For the details of  each national council at the outbreak of  the Pacific War, refer to Institute of  
Pacific Relations, “Interim Report of  the International Secretariat, 1939–1942,” IPR Fonds in the 
University of  British Columbia Archives (IPR Fonds-UBCA), box 45-4.   
10 American IPR, Understanding Asia, 8. 
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a time when Asian studies were still in the nascent stage in most Pacific countries, 
the IPR single-handedly took on the task of producing studies, promoting 
unofficial discussions, and disseminating information related to a variety of 
problems in the Pacific region.11  
Even though the IPR was an international body composed of eleven national 
councils, the American Council and the International Secretariat, both based in 
New York after 1933, actually led the organization. Meanwhile, with the Great 
Depression and New Deal policy of the 1930s, some liberal or progressive 
intellectuals had a predominant role in the American IPR. Three intellectuals, 
namely Edward C. Carter (1878–1954), Owen Lattimore (1900–1989), and 
Frederick V. Field (1905–2000), are especially worth noting. As Secretary General 
of the International Secretariat from 1933 to 1946, Carter contributed greatly to 
the enhancement of the IPR’s global positioning. Lattimore, a self-educated 
expert on China and Central Asia, joined the IPR as the editor of Pacific Affairs at 
the invitation of Carter. Dubbed a “red millionaire,” Field was Executive 
Secretary of the American Council from 1934 to 1940 and chaired the editorial 
board of Amerasia. While the three assumed a critical attitude toward the Japanese 
invasion of China, they tried to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union and 
the Chinese Communist Party.12 (During the McCarthy era, they were accused of 
purposefully leading the IPR to be used for pro-Communist and pro-Soviet 
purposes. This attack finally led to the dissolution of the IPR in 1960.)13 
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 posed a sharp challenge to the 
IPR because it seemed to make a mockery of the previous efforts of the 
organization, dedicated as they had been to improving diplomacy in the Pacific.14 
The International Secretariat launched a special research project to investigate the 
causes of the conflict and to propose a method of peaceful settlement in the Far 
East. This project was met with strong opposition from the Japanese Council, 
which feared that the project would necessarily develop “anti-Japanese” sen-
timents. Leading members of the Japanese Council argued that dealing with such 
a “hot and controversial” political issue would violate the fundamental principles 
that should govern the activities of the IPR, that is to say “nonpartisanship” and 
“objectivity.”15 Nevertheless, in the following years, numerous volumes on the 
background and probable consequences of the Sino-Japanese War appeared as 
11 Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 7–10. 
12 Ibid., 12–22; Alan Raucher, op. cit., 498–500. 
13 For details, refer to John N. Thomas, The Institute of  Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American 
Politics (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 1974).  
14 American IPR, Understanding Asia, 14. 
15 Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 34–35. 
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part of the IPR “Inquiry Series,” which was aided by a special grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation and was supported by all of the IPR national councils 
except the Japanese Council.16 
The outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, was the beginning of 
“the most eventful period in IPR history.” On that day, the war in the Far East 
merged with the conflict in Europe to become World War II.17 Millions of people 
around the world came to realize that the Pacific Ocean must be taken just as 
seriously as the Atlantic Ocean. In other words, in a single afternoon, Pearl 
Harbor dramatically proved the basic thesis of the IPR: “the Pacific does matter.”18 
The new emergency demands raised the question of whether the IPR should 
reconsider its program and change its whole emphasis. With regard to this matter, 
Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairperson of the American Council, announced: 
  
The immediate job of the American people is the prosecution of war 
against the military imperialism of Japan and the other Axis powers, whose 
defeat is the condition of any peaceful adjustment in the Far East and 
elsewhere. The tradition of the IPR does not permit “neutrality” in this 
issue; on the contrary, military aggression, in complete disregard of the 
rights of other peoples, contradicts everything the IPR has stood for. … 
Ultimately, when the Axis―with which Japan has tragically cast her lot―is 
defeated, there may come the opportunity for establishing a genuine new 
order in the Pacific.19 
  
In support of this aim, the American Council used its full resources. As “the 
foremost private center of Far Eastern and Pacific studies in the world,” the IPR 
proved to be a storehouse of specialized knowledge, materials, and people.20 
These resources were vital, not only in the task of winning the war, but also in 
postwar reconstruction. The American government utilized the IPR members in 
two major areas: publicity or wartime propaganda, and policy analysis and 
formulation. This state co-option was also evident in other countries. In Britain, 
the headquarters of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) was moved 
16 American IPR, Understanding Asia, 15; The I.P.R. Inquiry Series (Brochure, 1940), IPR Fonds-
UBCA, box 52-12.  
17 American Council, The IPR in Wartime: Annual Report of  the Secretary of  the American Council of  the 
Institute of  Pacific Relations (New York: American Council, 1943), 7. 
18 Ibid., 23. 
19 Ibid., 8. 
20 American IPR, Understanding Asia, 15. 
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to Oxford for intelligence work with other government departments, and a 
government grant was provided for RIIA activities.21 
Because of the presence of so many members of other councils in wartime 
Washington, the Pacific Council established an office in Washington in co-
operation with the American Council. This office had as its chief purpose close 
liaison between the staffs of the two Councils and the government agencies 
concerned with the Far East, the Embassies and the war missions of the other 
United Nations. The second function of the office was to facilitate a series of 
study groups on Pacific problems, utilizing the great concentration of competent 
experts now in Washington. The first in this series was a study group on China’s 
postwar economic problems, which drew together a number of Chinese and 
American experts from New York and Washington.22  
It should be noted here that Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek 
approached the IPR during the Pacific War. In August 1943, Secretary General 
Carter received an urgent and unsolicited invitation from Generalissimo Chiang to 
come at once to Chungking for the specific purpose of building and strengthening 
the Chinese IPR.23 Upon arrival in Chungking, Carter was received with exquisite 
courtesy. The Generalissimo started off with five “rapid-fire” questions:  
  
(1) What is the situation in India?  
(2) What is the American attitude toward Korea? 
(3) What will British policy in the Pacific be after the war? 
(4) What is the attitude of the American people to those two parts of war 
being waged in Europe and the Pacific? 
(5) What can I do to strengthen the China IPR so that it can play its full 
role in the international body?24 
  
We do not know Carter’s answers to these questions. However, it is certain 
that Generalissimo Chiang was anxious to know American and British public 
opinion and government policies toward the postwar Asia-Pacific region, 
especially colonial countries like India and Korea.  
 
  
21 Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 249–254. 
22 American Council, The IPR in Wartime, 10–11. 
23 Letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1943/08/17), IPR Records in the University 
of  Hawai‘i Archives (IPR Records-UHA), E-35/3. 
24 Pacific Council of  the IPR, “Atlantic City Meeting-Report of  the Secretary General” (bound 
volume, 1944), 4-5, IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 54-3.  
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THE EIGHTH PACIFIC CONFERENCE AND  
THE KOREAN PROBLEM 
 
The Eighth International Conference of the IPR was held at Mont Tremblant in 
the Province of Quebec, Canada, from December 4–14, 1942. This Conference 
was a “great milestone in the history of the IPR.”25 First of all, the meeting was 
convened at “a crucial stage of the Second World War.”26 Among 131 national 
delegates from twelve countries, namely Australia (4), Canada (18), China (18), 
“Fighting France” (4), India (10), Korea (1), Netherlands-Netherlands Indies (13), 
New Zealand (3), Philippines (4), Thailand (2), United Kingdom (20), and the 
United States (34), there were many policy-making officials departing from 
previous IPR conferences.27  
The American delegates included Lauchlin Currie (Administrative Assistant to 
the President of the United States), Stanley K. Hornbeck (Advisor on Political 
Relations, Department of State), Maxwell M. Hamilton (Chief, Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs, Department of State), C. F. Remer (Chief of the Far Eastern 
Section, Office of Strategic Services), James H. Shoemaker (Chairman, Board of 
Review of the Enemy Branch, Board of Economic Warfare), and Elbert D. 
Thomas (U.S. Senator from Utah, Democrat). The British delegation was led by 
Lord Hailey, a retired Governor of the Punjab and the United Provinces in India, 
and the then Chairman of the governing body of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies. He was “an effective propagandist and a god-send for the 
defense of the British Empire.” He was engaged in developing the idea of 
“partnership” between Britain and her dependent territories, as distinct from 
schemes for some form of international supervision for all colonies. The Chinese 
delegation consisted of both Chungking and Washington officials as well as 
scholars. Its chairman was Sao-ke Alfred Sze (Shih Chao-chi, 施肇基), formerly 
ambassador to London and Washington. They all took part in the conference in a 
“private” capacity.28  
It should also be noted that for the first time an Indian group and a “Free 
Thai” member attended the conference, and for the first time since 1927 a Korean, 
25 Letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1942/12/18), IPR Records-UHA, E-9b/16. 
26 International Secretariat, IPR ed., War and Peace in the Pacifìc: A Preliminary Report of  the Eighth 
Conference of  the Institute of  Pacifìc Relations on Wartime and Post-war Cooperation of  the United Nations in 
the Pacific and the Far East, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4–14, 1942 (New York: International 
Secretariat, IPR, 1943), 1. 
27 Ibid., Part VI. Conference Membership, 153–162. 
28 For the composition and characteristics of delegates of  each country to the Conference, refer to 
Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 194–206; Christopher G. Thorne, op.cit., 212–214. 
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Younghill Kang (Kang Yong-hŭl, 姜鏞訖, 1903–1972), attended independently as 
an observer. His introductory profile was as follows:  
  
Principal Economic Analyst of Board of Economic Warfare. Professor of 
Department of English, New York University (on leave of absence) and 
staff member of Metropolitan Museum of Art (on leave of absence). 
Formerly, Editorial staff member of Encyclopedia Britannica. Guggenheim 
Foundation Fellow on Creative Literature, 1933–35. Author of The Grass 
Roof (1931), The Happy Grove (1934), and East goes West (1937).29 
  
Although he was the first Korean writer to be widely known in the American 
literary world, he had not taken an active part in the Korean nationalist movement 
in the United States.30 He insisted on two things in the conference. First, in order 
for the Allies to effectively wage psychological warfare against Japan, they had to 
give some immediate gesture of recognition to the Korean independence 
movement. Second, following the principle of the self-determination of peoples 
of the Atlantic Charter, Korea should obtain complete independence after the 
war.31  
The main theme of the conference was the wartime and postwar cooperation 
of the United Nations. The round table discussions covered a variety of issues, 
including the future of colonial dependencies, the treatment of Japan after its 
defeat, and a broad outline of postwar international organization in the Pacific. 
Among them, the most contentious issue was how to apply the ideals and 
principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter to the world, especially to the 
dependencies of the colonial powers. The Charter, a joint declaration released by 
the United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill on August 14, 1941, laid the basic democratic principles on 
which the postwar world would be reconstructed, including collective security, 
self-determination, disarmament, liberal economic international order, and racial 
equality. Especially the third article of the Charter, on the subject of sovereign 
rights and self-government, was interpreted as a challenge to colonial rule. It 
indicated the need for a new system of governance. China as well as colonies in 
29 “Revised Who’s Who: Eighth Conference of  the Institute of  Pacifìc Relations” (Confidential) 
in the letter from Robert D. Calkins to Charles Loomis (1942/12/18), IPR Records-UHA, E-
9b/16, 5. 
30 Uk-tong Kim, Kang Yong-hŭl: kŭ ŭi sam kwa munhak [Younghill Kang: His life and literature], 
(Sŏul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2004), 69–77. 
31 “Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group II Round Tables” (December 9, 1942), IPR 
Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9, 3, 7. 
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Asia used it as a strong reference point to argue for equal status with, or 
independence from, colonial powers.32  
On this issue, a sharp conflict of opinions surfaced between the American and 
British delegates at Mont Tremblant. The American members expressed a 
considerable degree of suspicion and criticism of British imperial policies in Asia. 
Tyler Dennett (1883–1949), former historical adviser of the Department of State, 
emphasized in his memorandum to the conference that the American people 
would like to see a liquidation of the prewar colonial system and the abandonment 
of all kinds of imperial preferences. He explained, “the American soldier does not 
understand that he is fighting to restore to any European colonial power its lost 
position in Asia. This is a state of mind to be described but not to be argued with. 
It is just a fact.”33  
Under the heavy fire of criticism from members of the United States, Chinese, 
Canadian, Australian and Indian groups, the British and the Dutch members 
countered such assertions. For example, in the final plenary session, one Briton 
asserted that while Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter did not mean granting the 
immediate and unconditional independence of colonial areas, it did mean that full 
liberation and independence of colonial areas would be achieved when they 
arrived at a stage at which they could set up a form of government consistent with 
“modern ideas of civilization.” To this end, he explained the British government 
in its colonial policies had already engaged in promoting the growth of self-
governing institutions for the dependent areas and felt no hesitation to do 
anything possible to hasten the process. In short, he emphatically stated that as far 
as the British were concerned, the days of old imperialism characterized by 
domination and acquisition were already gone, and that they now had “quite a 
new concept of imperialism.”34 
While decolonization was arising as the most controversial issue, the Korean 
problem was discussed in relation to the future of the occupied areas of Japan. On 
this matter, the Chinese group took the lead. According to the rapporteur’s report 
on “Regional Round Table-Japan,” a Chinese member very explicitly stated 
China’s position. First, he said, China would ask that Manchuria be returned 
unconditionally. No international regime was acceptable. Second, Formosa 
likewise was Chinese from every point of view. It should revert to China with no 
32 Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 266–267; Yutaka Sasaki, Ph.D. dissertation, 183–184. 
33 Tyler Dennett, Security in the Pacific and the Far East: A Memorandum on Certain American Immediate 
Post-War Responsibilities (New York: American Council, IPR, 1942), 22, 36.  
34 International Secretariat, IPR ed., War and Peace in the Pacifìc, 118–120. 
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strings attached. Third, Korea was entitled to complete independence on all 
counts.35 
From these points in the Chinese statement, there was no dissent in the round 
table except that some debate developed around the future of Korea. The 
question was raised whether steps were not necessary to assure that an 
independent Korea, situated as it was in the Northeast Asia triangle, did not 
become a springboard of attack against China, the Soviet Union or even Japan. It 
was suggested that Korea was a good place for the United States to assume a 
mandate. American responsibility for Korea would be the best guarantee of the 
security of the area―better even than international control.36 (We cannot know 
who said this because the identity of speakers was not revealed in the reports of 
discussions. All statements at the conference were made solely on the individual 
responsibility of the speakers. Therefore, the participants were able to freely 
express their opinions in the round tables.) 
To this, the American members replied: (1) This would be a difficult 
assignment technically for the United States, to say the least. (2) More importantly, 
it would be regarded by United States’ public opinion as an extremely 
retrogressive step. It would look like parceling out colonies among the 
victors―“straight imperialism.” (3) Independence for Korea was the only course 
consistent with our war aims, and should be supplemented only by an inter-
national guarantee and international aid in rebuilding Korea’s national life if she 
requested aid, under the auspices of whatever international body emerged in the 
Pacific area.37  
The Korean problem was further discussed in another round table (“Topical 
Round Table: Political-Military Problems”). At this time there was agreement that 
Korea must be taken away from Japan. There was further agreement that 
following a long period of harsh Japanese administration, the country would be 
found in a very weak condition, clearly unable to stand entirely by itself. It was 
also the consensus that whatever was done regarding Korea must be done 
speedily for the purpose of strengthening and rehabilitating the country and its 
people.38  
35 “Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group II Round Tables” (December 9, 1942), IPR 




38 “Rapporteur’s Report: Plenary Session on Group III Round Tables” (December 12, 1942), 6, 
IPR Fonds-UBCA, box 51-9. The rapporteur was Frederick V. Field (Chairman, Editorial Board 
of  Amerasia).  
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The proposals for postwar Korea took two directions: the first was that Korea 
should be assigned to the United States as a mandate—subject, of course, to 
supervision and inspection by the regional organization. This proposal received 
rather strong support from some of the Chinese and Canadians present. The 
second proposal called for a United Nations declaration guaranteeing the 
independence of Korea immediately after the war and simultaneously 
guaranteeing her security from outside aggression. It also entailed asserting the 
willingness of the United Nations to provide any form of assistance Korea might 
request through the Regional Council. In the event of this solution being adopted, 
some members believed that the United States might be asked by the Regional 
Council to play a very prominent role in aiding Korea. The round table, however, 
did not reconcile these two proposals.39 
As is apparent in the summary of the round table discussions above, the crux 
of the Korean problem was choosing either to allow Korea immediate 
independence after the war or to implement a mandate over Korea. Concerning 
this matter, we need to pay attention to two persons, namely, Hugh Byas (1875–
1945) and Andrew J. Grajdanzev (1899–?). Byas, former Tokyo correspondent for 
The New York Times and The Times (London), published a book about Japan, 
Government by Assassination, shortly before participating in the conference as a 
British delegate.40 The position presented in his book follows: 
  
Korea’s case was different [from Formosa]. Korea is definitely a separate 
country with a racially distinct people whose leaders naturally want 
independence. But to thrust self-government on Korea in its present stage 
of development would be a cruel gift. Administration have to be trained, 
standards built up; an intelligent but wholly inexperienced people has to be 
protected from native exploitation while it learns how to use the 
[machinery] of representative government. Korea is separated from Japan 
by only one hundred miles of sea, and Japan cannot disinterest itself in 
Korea’s future since Korea, either helpless, as she was before, or dominated 
by a hostile power, is a mortal danger to Japan. …… My conclusion would 
be that, after an interval which should be distinctly stated in the treaty, 
Japan should be, under supervision, entrusted with the mandatory role in 
respect of Korea.41 
39 Ibid., 6–7. 
40 For a short introduction to his life and activities in Japan, refer to Peter B. Oblas, Hugh Byas, A 
British Editor Who Became a Leading Expert on Japan Between the First and Second World Wars: A 
Biographical History of  a Newspaper Journalist (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), “Preface” by 
John F. Howes. 
41 Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 359–360. 
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 In short, Byas justified his argument for Japan’s mandatory role over Korea 
after the war on the grounds of Korea’s geographical position and the Korean 
people’s lack of ability of self-government. His views of Korea were reflected in 
the following British memorandum to the conference: “The United Nations may 
decide to terminate Japanese control in Korea, but it is difficult to imagine Korea 
as anything but a very weak and disorderly State for a long time to come and it 
might become a field for political rivalry between China and Russia.” On the 
other hand, the paper emphasized that the Korean peasantry under Japanese rule 
had got the benefit, such as it was, of the improved economic conditions resulting 
from “the maintenance of peace and order.”42  
Grajdanzev, a Russian with long experience in Manchuria and Tientsin and a 
research associate of the International Secretariat of IPR since 1938,43 refuted 
Byas’ argument directly in his data paper to the conference, “Memorandum on 
Politics and Government in Korea.” He pointed out that Byas had reached such a 
conclusion without attempting to analyze the present situation in Korea. He 
criticized, “not one line is given to that.” He also insisted that, in the light of the 
past experience, to give Korea to Japan would amount to giving Japan one more 
chance of attacking its neighbors. He concluded: “Korea should be an in-
dependent state irrespective of the fears or doubts which some Japanese or some 
Americans may entertain in respect to her geographical position. Negation of such 
status to Korea would be the most fragrant [flagrant] of any imaginable broken 
pledges made in this war by the United Nations.”44  
What is more interesting is his claim that a newly independent Korea should 
become “a cooperative commonwealth.” He noted that the fall of the Japanese 
regime would permit the complete eradication of the social wrongs of the old 
42 “A Prelminary Survey,” Problems of  the Post-war Settlement in the Far East: An Interim Report by a 
Group of  Members of  the Royal Institute of  International Affairs (London: The Royal Institute of  
International Affairs, 1942), 2, 9. 
43 His educational background is as follows: 1899, Born in Ussolye, Siberia, Russia; 1922–23, 
Polytechnical Institute of  Machanics (Irkutsk, Siberia); 1923–24, State University (Irkutsk, Siberia); 
1924–28, B.A., M.A., School of  Law and Economics (Harbin, Manchuira); 1934–37, Research 
Worker of  the Institute of  Economics, Nankai University (Tientsin, China); 1937–38, M.A., 
University of  California (Berkeley); 1939–43, Ph.D., Columbia University (New York). “Project: 
Study of  the Town of  Fukaya, Conducted by Dr. A. J. Grad [Grajdanzev]” (1948/05/26), IPR 
Papers, Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, box 315. For details, refer to Ko 
Chŏng-hyu, “A. J. Kŭrach’ŭtanjep’ŭ wa《Hyŏndae Han’guk》” [A. J. Grajdanzev and Modern 
Korea], Han’guksa yŏn’gu [The Journal of  Korean History], 126 (September 2004).  
44 Andrew J. Grajdanzev, “Memorandum on Korean Government and Politics,” International 
Secretariat [of  the IPR] Paper No.10 (December 1942), 13, 16. This paper was a preliminary draft 
of  two chapters intended for inclusion in a book, Modern Korea, which was published in the 
International Research Series of  the IPR in 1944.   
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Korean regime, and that a possible solution for the central problem of Korean 
reconstruction should be the nationalization of industry and of land, and a great 
advance in cooperation.45 This argument seems to have reflected a progressive 
tendency within the International Secretariat of the IPR after the Great 
Depression. 
In the meantime, the Chinese members, having a more profound interest in 
Korea than most other participants, assumed an ambiguous attitude. For example, 
S. R. Chow (Zuo Gengsheng, 周鯁生, 1889–1971), professor of international law 
of Wuhan National University, stated in his paper that there was no reason why 
this once independent kingdom, with a population of 22 million and a civilization 
even more ancient than that of the Japanese, should not be given political 
freedom after Japan’s defeat. Then, he stressed the importance of “a period of 
tutelage” during which the native peoples of pre-war colonies or dependencies, 
owing to their political immaturity, would have an opportunity to prepare 
themselves for self-government.46 His conclusion follows:  
  
Finally, if it should appear that the Korean people, after liberation from the 
Japanese yoke, still need friendly advice and assistance in the initial stages 
of their political freedom, the United States would be in the best position 
to assume this responsibility. This is true not only because of American 
disinterestedness and the traditional friendship which exists between the 
United States and Korea, but also because American financial resources 
would be needed to help the newly freed country in its effort to rebuild a 
national life.47 
  
As stated above, Chow intimated that Korea would need America’s support 
for a period of years after the war. Interestingly, Dennett expressed the view in his 
memorandum to the conference that “probably the United States would do a 
good deal for Korea.”48 He was suggesting the United States might parallel in 
Korea its performance in the Philippines, though the process of attaining 
independence would have to be greatly accelerated. He emphasized that the 
motives which had once led the United States to retain the Philippines were 
“philanthropic”. The feeling that they were doing somebody some good sustained 
Americans’ interest through the years. At the same time, he stressed that the 
45 Ibid., 20. 
46 S. R. Chow, “The Pacific after the War,” Foreign Affairs, 21-1 (October 1942), 77–78. Chow 
expanded this article and submitted a data paper (“A Permanent Order for the Pacific”) to the 
Mont Tremblant Conference which actually reflected the basic position of  the Chinese delegation. 
47 Ibid., 80.  
48 Tyler Dennett, Security in the Pacific and the Far East, 28. 
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United States had followed, broadly, “a policy of benevolence” toward the nations 
of the Far East since the middle of the nineteenth century. He wanted to show 
that the tradition of America’s foreign policy was radically distinct from European 
imperialism.49 
  
THE NINTH PACIFIC CONFERENCE AND  
THE KOREAN PROBLEM 
 
The Ninth International Conference of the IPR was held at Hot Springs, Virginia 
(United States) from January 5–17, 1945. In the last stage of the Second World 
War, more than 150 delegates from twelve countries attended the conference.50 
Although all the delegations included a majority of non-governmental personnel, 
both business and academic in character, it was quite clear that in the main all of 
the groups tended to reflect, in general if not in detail, the official attitudes of their 
countries on the question at issue.51 
According to a confidential report of the U.S. Department of State, the 
national delegations at the conference differed markedly in the abilities of their 
members, in the tactics they employed, and in the prominence they assumed in 
the discussions. The British group was in some respects the strongest, possessing 
many able members and presenting a solidly united front on most questions. The 
Chinese delegation was not outstanding. Its members generally presented a united 
front in formal meetings but appeared to hold divergent and not always clearly 
thought out opinions on some of the leading problems in personal conversations. 
The French and the Dutch tended to follow the British lead in the Dependent 
Areas discussions. The Indian delegation was voluble but generally ineffective. 
The Korean, “Free Thai,” and Philippine delegations confined themselves as a 
rule to prepared statements relating directly to their own countries.52 
The question of Korean participation in the conference was decided at the 
Atlantic City meeting of the Pacific Council in January 1944. After that, Secretary 
49 Ibid., 8–11, 15, 18–19. 
50 International Secretariat, IPR ed., Security in the Pacifìc: A Preliminary Report of  the Ninth Conference 
of  the Institute of  Pacifìc Relations, Hot Springs, Virginia, 6-17, 1945 (New York: Institute of  Pacific 
Relations, 1945), Appendix III, Conference Membership.  
51 Raymond Dennett, “Report on the Ninth Intemational Conference of  the Institute of  Pacific 
Relations” (1945/04/26, confidential memorandum), IPR Records-UHA, box A-11/11. 
52 Department of  State, U.S., “Minutes of  The Hot Springs IPR Conference” (1945/01/25, 
Confidential), The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of  China, Volume II, Prepared by the 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of  the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of  the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1970), 1283. 
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General Carter wrote to five Korean organizations in the United Sates and asked 
them to nominate three qualified Koreans who would be invited to the Hot 
Springs Conference as observers. In the letter the following was emphasized: 
“The IPR is desirous that all who attend its Conference should be able to 
contribute from their own knowledge and experience and also stimulate further 
investigation and research on Pacific problems. Koreans whose names we would 
like to have you suggest should therefore have outstanding research experience 
and recent knowledge of conditions in Korea.”53 
The Korean delegation comprised three members: Dr. Henry Chung (Chŏng 
Han-gyŏng, 鄭翰景, 1890–1985), a member of the Korean Commission in 
Washington, D.C.; Ilhan New (Yu Ir-han, 柳一韓, 1895–1971), Chairman of 
Korea Economic Society in New York; and Dunn Jacob Kyuang (Chŏn Kyŏng-
mu, 田耕武, 1900–1947), Secretary of Public Relations, United Korean 
Committee in America. Born in Korea’s northwest region (P’yongan Province) 
and educated in America since childhood, they were playing an active role in the 
Korean independence movement during the Pacific War, especially to obtain the 
United States recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of 
Korea in exile, which was by this time in Chungking, China. They hoped that the 
new, postwar Korea would form a government similar to that of the United 
States.54 They also thought that it would be vital to obtain America’s support and 
assistance against the potential threat of surrounding powers, especially Soviet 
Russia.55 (In 1947, Dr. Chung wrote a book, The Russians Came to Korea, which 
criticized Soviet occupation policy in North Korea.)  
The agenda of the Hot Springs conference was extremely comprehensive, 
with the result that almost all Far Eastern current and postwar problems received 
some measure of attention. Topics which stood out particularly were the 
treatment of defeated Japan, postwar Far Eastern economic development, the 
advancement of dependent peoples, and collective security in the Pacific. 
Decolonization continued to be the most divisive topic among participants. Along 
53 E. C. Carter to Korean Commission, United Korean Committee in America, Sino-Korean 
Peoples’ League, Korean Affairs Institute, Korean Economic Society (1944/10/10), IPR Papers, 
Columbia University, box 349. 
54 Henry Chung, Korea and the United States through War and Peace, 1943–1960 (Seoul: Yonsei 
University Press, 2000), “Foreword” by Young Ick Lew; Sŏng-gi Cho, Yu Ir-han p’yŏngjŏn [A critical 
biography of  New Ilhan], (Sŏul: Chagŭn Ssiat, 2005). 
55 Planning and Research Board of  the United Korean Committee in America, Condensed Reference: 
Korea and the Pacific War; a memorandum prepared as a partial plan for more effective participation by the 
Korean people in the present war and as a guide to an understanding of  Korea’s present and post-war problems, her 
economic status and the capacity of  her people to carry on an enlightened and stable self-government (Los Angeles: 
United Korean Committee in America, 1943), 12, 32–36. 
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with the Chinese and Indian members, many North American members attacked 
European colonialism. This shocked and angered members from Britain, France, 
and the Netherlands. European groups were not ready to commit to the self-
determination of colonies or to give up their colonial rights. They insisted on the 
“native’s incompetence to self-govern” and explained colonialism as the “white 
man’s burden.”56  
Regarding Korea, the Cairo Declaration was a reference point for the 
discussion. The Declaration, released by the United States, Republic of China, and 
the United Kingdom on December 1, 1943, said that “in due course Korea shall 
become free and independent.” This obscure phrase attracted considerable 
attention at the conference. Many questioned how long “in due course” was likely 
to be. A British member stated: 
  
Judging partly from the experience of Burma, it is likely to take a long time 
to place Korea on a stable, independent basis. Someone will have to create 
a whole corpus of law and work out tariff and customs arrangements. 
Korea has been so closely integrated with the Japanese economic system 
that it will require a major surgical operation to separate them. Who will 
meet the cost? The resources of Korea may be quite inadequate. It may 
take years to establish a satisfactory working administration.57 
  
Contrary to the British view, Korean delegates expressed the hope that Korea 
would regain full sovereignty in the shortest possible time, not exceeding six 
months. They emphasized the geographical and cultural homogeneity and 
economic self-sufficiency of their country as arguments why an independent 
Korea could be quickly established. It was their belief that their people would, 
after a very short period, be as well or better qualified for independence than the 
Filipinos. They conceded that a military government led by foreign countries 
might be necessary for up to two years, but assured participants a provisional 
Korean government could be established within six months of the country’s 
liberation. They also explained that a tutelary government of the Great Powers 
should not be necessary at all, but, if deemed necessary, should be by several 
rather than by one or two powers. If a single power was deemed necessary, 
Korea’s preference was the United States.58 
In the round table discussions on collective security, a Korean member stated 
that his country had two main interests: first, “to get rid of Japanese domination,” 
56 Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 271–272. 
57 Department of  State, “Minutes of  the Hot Springs IPR Conference,” 1283. 
58 Ibid., 1282–1283. 
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and second, to secure international cooperation, particularly by the Great Powers, 
in establishing Korean independence. In his view, Korean independence required 
the establishment of an effective international organization. Due to its history and 
its geographical situation, Korea was vulnerable to aggression. Japan, of course, 
had to be disarmed, but Korea welcomed the growth of a strong [Nationalist] 
China. An interim arrangement among the Great Powers in which Korean peace 
and security could be guaranteed was seen as potentially valuable. Korea, however, 
did not desire to remain a protégé of the Great Powers. “She wished to stand on 
her own feet as early as possible.”59 
Chinese members, in general, appeared to sympathize with the views of the  
Korean delegation, but some sided with the British, saying that “the problem is 
not as simple as our Korean friends would have us think.”60 Before attending the 
Hot Springs conference, S. R. Chow asserted that many well-informed writers, 
with full sympathy for the cause of Korea, had expressed doubt about the capacity 
of the Korean people to sustain full immediate autonomy, especially in view of 
the fact that they had been under Japanese “enslavement” for nearly forty years. 
He insisted that there was also substantial agreement even among ardent 
advocates of Korea’s independence that some sort of interim arrangement for 
outside assistance to the newly-freed people would be inevitable before they could 
be safely left to fully govern themselves. He concluded that American assistance, 
in whatever form, under international supervision would be a much simpler and 
safer scheme to carry out both for the good of the Korean nation and the interest 
of world peace.61 
Meanwhile, the American delegation had reached agreement on Korea’s 
postwar status in the preliminary meeting in October 1944: 
  
It was generally agreed that a one-country mandate for Korea would be 
undesirable. International administration or some forms of international 
assistance were proposed as alternatives during the period prior to full 
admission of Korea to the international community. It was suggested that 
perhaps no valid reason exists for denying Korean full independence after 
hostilities cease in the Far East and that recognition of such a status with 
offers of international assistance might be the best policy in relation to 
general security and economic development in the Pacific.62  
59 Department of  State, “Minutes of  the Hot Springs IPR Conference,” 1293. 
60 Ibid., 1283. 
61 S. R. Chow, Winning the Peace in the Pacific: A Chinese View of  Far Eastern Postwar Plans and 
Requirements for a Stable Security System in the Pacific Area (New York: The Macmillan company, 1944), 
42–46. 
62  “Preliminary Meeting of  American Delegation to the 1945 Conference” (1944/10/28, 
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 At the Hot Springs conference an American member suggested that “in due 
course” might be taken to mean “as soon as an election can be called.” Another 
member proposed that full Korean independence be recognized, that Korea be 
encouraged to develop a provisional government as rapidly as possible, and that 
the United Nations forces in Korea be withdrawn as soon as a provisional 
government was established.63  
In these statements, the American delegation seemed to favor the view of the 
Korean members. But Dennett, an American authority on the Far East, publicly 
expressed that a premature recognition of Korean sovereignty might leave it, as in 
1882, an object of international rivalries— economic, strategic and ideological—
with only the illusion of the security that thus far had been blueprinted. Thus he 
concluded: “The best that the Koreans could hope for, after the Japanese have 
been driven out, is a considerable period of international protection, direction, 
and support, comparable with the earlier stages of the American administration of 
the Philippines.”64 This argument, in fact, reflected the position of President 
Roosevelt and the Department of State.  
At this point, Grajdanzev’s view of the Korean problem must be considered. 
In an article published in Foreign Affairs (April 1944), he pointed out the problems 
of a mandate system to render “administrative advice and assistance by a 
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.” According to him, of 
all the mandated countries and territories after World War I, only one, Iraq, had 
achieved formal, not actual, independence. Nevertheless, “Korea might be made a 
mandate, but what country will be the mandatory power? Neither China nor 
Russia would wish to see Korea in the other’s hands. Some have suggested that 
Korea be made a ward of the United States, but it seems clear that American 
public opinion would be against taking on such a responsibility.” He also 
emphasized that Korea had all the prerequisites for an independent existence in 
the modern world, and that the Koreans themselves demanded independence, not 
the status of a mandate. He reached the conclusion: “It is best for Korea, and for 
world peace, that she takes the responsibility for her own development, not ‘in 
due course,’ but at once.”65  
As Grajdanzev stated, Soviet Russia had a strong interest in Korea. But it did 
not participate in the IPR conferences in 1942 and 1945 because of “wartime 
conditions.”66 At the Hot Springs conference, it was noted that “a full quorum 
Confidential), IPR Records-UHA, box A-11/4. 
63 International Secretariat, IPR ed., Security in the Pacifìc, 38. 
64 Tyler Dennett, “In Due Course,” Far Eastern Survey, 14-1 (January 1945), 3–4. 
65 A. J. Grajdanzev, “Korea in the Postwar World,” Foreign Affairs, 22-3 (April 1944), 482–483. 
66 “Minutes of  Meeting of  the Pacific Council: Hot Springs, Virginia” (1945), IPR Fonds-UBCA, 
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was not present until Russia had given some indication as to its policy on Korea.” 
A Chinese member expressed the view that Russia’s interest in Korea was similar 
to that of China, as a neighbor that desires to see peace and prosperity in the 
peninsular and is willing, in concert with other powers, to take part in some 
organized form of friendly international assistance. Other participants regarded 
Russia, though neutral in the Pacific theater of war, as a natural and important 
member of the regional and world community they envisaged.67  
Although the participants at the conference, taken as a whole, expressed their 
desires for Russia’s positive role in the postwar world, there were underlying fears 
of its potential threat to their objectives. For example, Chiang Kai-shek had told 
Lattimore, once his American advisor, that Korea should be a “semi-independent 
[state] under American and Chinese tutelage” to exclude Russian influence from 
that peninsula.68 In short, China’s political leaders and intellectuals tried to make 
an ally of America to maintain the balance of power in Northeast Asia. For this 
reason S. R. Chow had pushed strongly for America’s “disinterested assistance” 
for Korea. But President Roosevelt and the Department of Sate disagreed, 
insisting that isolation of the Russians in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean 
would create, not relieve, tensions. An international trusteeship, they thought, 
would be the only way to preempt troubles in postwar Korea and thereby keep 
intact postwar cooperation among the “Big Four” in Asia and in global affairs.69 
Dennett’s aforementioned emphasis on “a considerable period of international 
protection, direction, and support” was to mean the necessity of the trusteeship 




Daizaburō Yui (油井大三郞), a professor at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, 
attempted an interesting analysis on the role of American intellectuals in drawing 
up and implementing reform plans for postwar Japan. According to his book, 
progressive scholars affiliated with the International Secretariat and the American 
Council of the IPR during the Pacific War desired “a thorough democratic reform 
from the bottom up” in postwar Japan. They actually had a direct involvement in 
the initial reforms of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),70 
box 54-4, 5.   
67 International Secretariat, IPR ed., Security in the Pacifìc, 38. 
68 Xiaoyuan Liu, “Sino-American Diplomacy over Korea during World War II,” The Journal of  
American-East Asian Relations, 1-2 (Summer 1992), 240. 
69 Ibid., 251. 
70 The term “Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)” refers both to the person who 
embodied that position and the supporting bureaucracy. 
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such as the release of political prisoners, the abolition of the military and the 
destruction of armament industries, the encouragement of labor union movements, 
the dissolution of zaibatsu, and land reforms. However, conservative anti-
communists within SCAP were hostile to the radical reformers and submitted a 
report on their activities to General MacArthur in June 1947. In this report, the 
IPR was condemned as a “very powerful left-leaning pressure group.” Eventually, 
those who were involved in the IPR were suppressed or removed from the 
Government Section of SCAP, and their reform efforts to “democratize” Japan 
were frustrated. This was the so-called “Reverse Course.” As Cold War 
preoccupation became dominant in SCAP and the U.S. government, they wanted 
to make Japan a bastion of anticommunism through the means of economic 
recovery and remilitarization.71  
Something similar took place in Korea. When Japan was defeated in 1945, the 
Korean people hoped for complete independence and radical changes in the 
structure of the Japanese colonial governance, such as the purge of Korean 
collaborators with Imperial Japan, land reforms, and the nationalization of main 
industries. It was Grajdanzev, researcher of the International Secretariat of the 
IPR, who actively spoke on behalf of the Korean people. He believed that the 
most effective way to dissolve the feudal system or fascism in East Asia was 
through revolutionary land reforms. He also considered complete dissolution of 
the Japanese Empire crucial to stabilization and peace in postwar East Asia. His 
insistence on the establishment of a “centralized democratic republic” in liberated 
Korea was one way to prevent the revival of Japan as a “New Empire.”72 
However, postwar military occupation and administration of Korea by the United 
States and the Soviet Union made Koreans’ hope of building a sovereign nation 
state crumble to dust.  
China came under the control of  the Communists in 1949, and the Korean 
War broke out in the following year. McCarthyism gained strength in the United 
States as its foreign policy toward East Asia turned out a failure. The IPR, an 
aggregate of  Asia experts within the United States, became the first victim of  this 
movement. Joseph R. McCarthy, a senator from Wisconsin, criticized Lattimore as 
“one of  the principal architects of  our Far Eastern policy” and accused him of  
71 Daizaburō Yui, Mikan no senryō kaikaku: Amerika chishikijin to suterareta Nihon minshuka kōsō 
[Unfinished occupation reform: American intellectuals and abandonment of  the democratization 
of  Japan], (Tokyo: University of  Tokyo Press, 1989), 241–249, 259–265; Tomoko Akami, op. cit., 
259–265. 
72 Andrew J. Grajdanzev, “Problems of  Korean Independence,” Modern Korea, 276–290; “Land 
Reform in Japan,” Pacific Affairs, 21-2 (June 1948), 115–135. 
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pro-Communist leanings.73 Meanwhile, the Internal Security Subcommittee was 
formed under the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and started an investigation 
on the IPR. Carter and Lattimore were summoned to testify before the 
Subcommittee, and Grajdanzev was also called for a closed hearing. He stated at 
the hearing that he had never been a member of  a political party or any group 
that had a political intention.74 He gave up all his academic activities after the 
publication of  Land and Peasant in Japan: An Introductory Survey in 1952. (This book 
was translated and published in Japan in the following year.)75 The IPR, which 
had laid the foundation of  scientific research on the Asia-Pacific region in a whirl 
of  wars and revolutions in the first half  of  the twentieth century, dissolved itself  
at the end of  1960. 
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